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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
If you walk along practically any beach in Santa Barbara, 
California, you will likely discover a sticky black substance attached 
to the bottom of your feet.   You will find the source of this substance 
if you look just offshore—offshore oil and natural gas drilling 
platforms.  The presence of oil and natural gas drilling platforms has 
long been a familiar sight off the California coast, as California was 
the first site of offshore oil drilling.1  However, many of the drilling 
platforms off of the California coast will stop producing significant 
amounts of oil or natural gas, and become obsolete in the next twenty 
years.  This raises the question of what will become of these obsolete 
drilling platforms dotting the California coastline. 
Traditionally, these obsolete drilling platforms would be 
scheduled for decommissioning, and complete removal of the entire 
platform would be required.2  The development of the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project (“Project”), however, provides another potential option for 
the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas drilling platforms.  The 
Rigs-to-Reef Project allows for partial, rather than complete, removal 
of the drilling platforms.  The remaining portion of the platform is 
then donated to the state and turned into an artificial reef. 
The Rigs-to-Reef Project, however, remains controversial.  
The controversy consists of two main concerns.  The first main 
concern is the environmental impact that partial decommissioning 
will have on the marine environment.  The second main concern is 
the economic benefit provided to oil companies, and the liability and 
                                                          
* Emily Edwards is a third year law student at Pepperdine University 
School of Law.  Emily graduated from the University of California Los Angeles 
with a Bachelors of Arts in Political Science.  She would like to thank the NAALJ 
editors for their hard work and assistance throughout the writing and editing 
process.  Emily would also like to thank her family and friends for their support 
and encouragement. 
 
1 See infra note 5. 
2 See infra note 49.  The federal and state leases provided to oil and gas 
companies for offshore oil drilling require that once the lease expires, or the 
drilling platform becomes obsolete, that the oil or gas company completely remove 
the drilling platform and restore the seabed to its natural state.  Id.   
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costs assumed by states that implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project.3  
The controversy has caused implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project to be slow.  This is especially true regarding implementation 
of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California.  It has taken California over 
a decade, and three separate legislative attempts, to implement the 
Rigs-to-Reef Project.  In September of 2010, the California 
Legislature passed A.B. 2503, which finally allows California to 
implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project.4 
Considering that it took the California Legislature over a 
decade to pass a law implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project, the 
question exists as to how A.B. 2503 was finally able to generate 
enough legislative and public support to become law.  This Comment 
will address this question by first examining California’s legislative 
history surrounding the Rigs-to-Reef Project and then by evaluating 
A.B 2503.  The primary focus in evaluating A.B. 2503 will be to 
determine whether the law sufficiently addresses the environmental 
and economic concerns associated with the controversy surrounding 
the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  Finally, the Comment will postulate what 
future steps remain necessary for the successful implementation of 
the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California. 
 
A.  Historical Overview of Offshore Oil Drilling 
 
In order to properly discuss A.B. 2503, allowing the 
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California, it is first 
necessary to briefly examine the history of offshore oil drilling in the 
United States.  The exploration of oil and natural gas resources began 
in the late nineteenth century, with the first oil well being drilled off 
of the coast of California in 1896.5  The existence of oil and natural 
                                                          
3 See infra note 85.  Oil companies would save billions of dollars on 
removal costs for each offshore oil and gas platform that they were able to partially 
rather than completely remove.  Id. 
4 California Marine Resources Act, CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6601 
(West 2010). 
5 U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND 
GAS RESOURCES: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.boem.gov/search-results.aspx?q=greenbook-leasingdocument.pdf, 
(click on “1. GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf”).  The first offshore oil rig was 
drilled in Summerland, California thirty-eight years after the first onshore oil rig in 
Pennsylvania.  Id. at 2.  These early offshore oil rigs did not resemble the modern 
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gas along the coastline combined with the emergence of oil as 
America’s primary energy resource encouraged further development 
of offshore oil drilling, including the ability to drill for oil in deep, 
open water.6   
America’s increasing demand for oil combined with the 
development of offshore oil drilling further from shore in deeper 
waters caused tensions between the Federal Government and the state 
governments over jurisdictional control over the waters.7  The states 
asserted that they could control the lease agreements for drilling in 
the seabed in the waters off of their coast, while the Federal 
Government asserted jurisdiction based on the fact that the drilling 
was being done in the continental shelf.8  In 1945, President Truman 
gave a proclamation in which he recognized the tensions that existed 
regarding the jurisdiction of the oil and other natural resources being 
extracted from the continental shelf in the coastal waters of the 
United States.9  In this proclamation, President Truman established 
that the Federal Government had jurisdiction over the natural 
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf located 
off of the coast of the United States.10 
                                                          
floating steel oil rigs that remain in coastal waters today, but the original oil rigs 
were built on wooden wharfs that extended into the ocean.  Id. at 3. 
6 Id. at 2–3.  With technological developments in the steel industry, the oil 
industry was able to expand its drilling into “open, unprotected waters” by the late 
1930’s.  Id. at 3.  By 1947, the first oil well was drilled in open water from a fixed 
platform, which meant drilling was no longer limited to drills attached to wharfs on 
shore, but oil drills could be placed further off shore in open water.  Id.  
7 Dan Rothbach, Rigs-to-Reefs: Refocusing the Debate in California, 17 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 283, 284 (2007).  See also U.S. DEP'T OF THE 
INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND GAS RESOURCES: OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF, supra note 5, at 5. 
8 U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND 
GAS RESOURCES: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, supra note 5, at 5.  See also 
Rothbach, supra note 7, at 284. 
9 Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Oct. 1, 1945). 
10 Id.  President Truman outlines the rational for federal jurisdiction by 
stating that 
 
concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its 
natural resources, the Government of the United States regards 
the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental 
shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the 
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In the late 1940’s, in an effort to assert the jurisdictional 
rights it had established in the 1945 Proclamation, the Federal 
Government brought suit against California seeking to enjoin 
California from trespassing on the natural resources of the seabed 
subject to federal jurisdiction.11 California responded to the claim 
admitting that it had been issuing leases to individuals and 
corporations for the extraction of petroleum, but asserted it was 
acting within its jurisdiction as these leases only allowed extraction 
of petroleum from land within the three miles subject to state 
jurisdiction.12  The Supreme Court recognized states’ interests in 
having jurisdiction over the natural resources of the seabed and 
continental shelf.13  However, the Supreme Court then went on to 
validate the 1945 Proclamation by upholding the Federal 
Government’s jurisdiction over all oil and other natural resources of 
the seabed and continental shelf, and refused to limit the Federal 
Government’s jurisdiction to beyond a three mile boundary from the 
                                                          
United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its 
jurisdiction and control. 
 
Id.  He further specified the federal jurisdiction by specifically declaring that “all 
sea [bed] natural resources beyond the [three] mile jurisdiction of most coastal 
states were the property of the United States.”  Id.  Thus coastal states had limited 
jurisdiction over the seabed, which extended up to three miles from shore, but the 
seabed beyond the three miles was subject to federal jurisdiction.  See U.S. DEP'T 
OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND GAS RESOURCES: 
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, supra note 5, at 5. 
 
11 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 23, supplemented sub nom. 
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 804 (1947).  The United States government 
alleged that: 
 
California, acting pursuant to state statutes, but without authority 
from the United States, has negotiated and executed numerous 
leases with persons and corporations purporting to authorize 
them to enter upon the described ocean area to take petroleum, 
gas, and other mineral deposits, and that the lessees have done so, 
paying to California large sums of money in rents and royalties 
for the petroleum products taken . . . . 
 
Id. 
12 Id. at 23–24. 
13 Id. 
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coastline.14  When Louisiana and Texas challenged the federal 
jurisdiction over oil drilling and exploration within their states 
claiming they were the “sole owners of the offshore seabed adjacent 
to their coast,” this Supreme Court decision was extended to both 
states.15 
In response to these Supreme Court decisions, in 1953, 
Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, which provided states 
with jurisdiction over the natural resources and the seabed up to three 
nautical miles from the states’ coastline.16  In enacting this 
legislation, Congress recognized that states should have some control 
over the management and development of the natural resources and 
the seabed directly off of their coast.17  Although the Submerged 
                                                          
14 Id. at 40–41.  Thus, the Supreme Court established federal jurisdiction 
over the entire seabed and continental shelf, without being subject to limitation by 
state jurisdiction.  See also Rothbach, supra note 7, at 284–85. 
15 Id.; see also United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), 
superseded by statute, Submerged Lands Act, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953); United 
States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), superseded by statute, Submerged Lands Act, 
ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953).  The coastal states sought to control the oil drilling and 
natural resources off of their coasts, resented the fact that the Federal Government 
was leasing oil wells without state permission, and sought control over these 
lucrative and important natural resources.  See generally U.S. DEP'T OF THE 
INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND GAS RESOURCES: OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF, supra note 5, at 5. 
16 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2002).  With the Submerged Lands Act, 
Congress directly contradicted the previous Supreme Court decisions, which had 
established federal jurisdiction over all of the natural resources and the seabed.  
The Supreme Court later upheld the Submerged Lands Act stating that Congress 
had the power to relinquish, to the states, the federal government's property rights 
over the submerged lands without interfering with U.S. national sovereign interests.  
See Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273–76 (1954). 
17 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315.  Congress specifically stated that: 
 
It is hereby determined and declared to be in the public interest 
that (1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable 
waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the 
natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right 
and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said 
lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable 
State law . . . . 
 
Thus Congress, by providing the states with some jurisdictional control over the 
natural resources and seabed up to three nautical miles from the coastline, sought to 
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Lands Act clarified federal and state jurisdiction over the natural 
resources and seabed, it did not include provisions on leasing or 
development of the submerged lands.18  Congress enacted the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) in 1953 in an effort to 
establish leasing and development policies and procedures for the 
submerged lands.19  Under the OCSLA, the Secretary of the Interior 
oversees the mineral exploration and development of the outer 
continental shelf.20  The OCSLA was primarily concerned with 
encouraging the development of oil exploration, and thus only 
provided limited regulation of the oil exploration and drilling along 
the continental shelf.21 
The state and federal governments both encouraged the 
development and exploration of offshore oil drilling into the late 
1960’s.22  This lead to the first major environmental disaster related 
to offshore oil drilling, an oil and natural gas leak that occurred in 
1969.23  Union Oil had received a lease from the Federal Government 
to conduct offshore oil drilling about five miles off of the coast of 
                                                          
promote the development and exploration of offshore energy resources, especially 
oil and natural gas.  Id. 
18 Rothbach, supra note 7, at 285; see also H.R. REP. NO. 83-413, at 1 
(1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2177, 2177. 
19 OCS Lands Act History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Outer-Continental-
Shelf/Lands-Act-History/OCSLA-HIstory.aspx.  
20 Id.  The OCSLA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to lease land in 
the outer continental shelf, subject to federal jurisdiction, to the “highest qualified 
responsible bidder” through a competitive bidding process.  Id.  The OCSLA 
provides guidelines for the oil and gas exploration and development on the 
continental shelf, and allows the Secretary to adjust regulations as necessary.  Id. 
21 H.R. REP. NO. 83-413, at 4 (1953).  The OCSLA’s main provision 
regulating the leases and oil drilling only required the “exercise of reasonable 
diligence in the operation of the lease and to conduct [the] operations in a sound 
and efficient oilfield practice so as to prevent waste therein.”  Id.  Thus, the 
OCSLA generally refrained from implementing new or changing preexisting safety 
and environmental regulations for oil drilling, but instead applied the established 
industry practices to offshore oil drilling on the continental shelf.  Id.; see also 
Rothbach, supra note 7, at 285.   
22 Sean B. Hecht, California’s New Rigs-to-Reefs Law, UCLA INST. OF  
THE ENV’T AND SUSTAINABILITY, available at 
http://www.environment.ucla.edu/reportcard/article.asp?parentid=9389.  
23 Rothbach, supra note 7, at 285–86. 
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Santa Barbara, California.24  During the drilling process, pressure 
began to build in the casing surrounding the oil well, causing the 
casing on the well to split and large cracks to form in the seabed 
surrounding the well.25  Large amounts of oil and natural gas were 
released from the well and seabed, causing thirty-five miles of 
coastline to be covered in oil and eight hundred square miles of ocean 
to be affected by the oil spill.26  This oil spill resulted in public and 
political backlash against the oil companies and raised new concerns 
regarding offshore oil drilling.27  In response to the spill, California 
exercised its jurisdiction over state waters by refusing to allow the 
development of new offshore oil drilling sites.28  The Federal 
Government continued to allow development of new oil drilling sites 
in federal waters until 1984.29  In 1984, Congress banned the use of 
federal funds for new oil development off the California coast.30 
Also, as a direct result of the oil spill, the Federal 
Government passed several acts that sought to regulate offshore oil 
drilling.31  These acts include the National Environmental Protection 
Policy Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act.  The National 
Environmental Protection Policy Act requires a detailed 
environmental review before any major or controversial federal 
action can be taken, while the Coastal Zone Management Act 
requires state review of any federal action that will affect the land 
and water use of the coastal zone.32  Despite this increased federal 
regulation, it remained unclear whether environmental reports were 
                                                          
24 K.C. Clarke & Jeffrey J. Hemphill, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill, A 
Retrospective, Y.B. OF THE ASS’N OF PAC. COAST GEOGRAPHERS, at 157–162 
 (2002), available at 
http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~kclarke/Papers/SBOilSpill1969.pdf; see also Rothbach, 
supra note 7, at 286. 
25 Clarke, supra note 24, at 157–58. 
26 Id. at 160–61. 
27 Id. at 161. 
28 Hecht, supra note 22. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 OCS Lands Act History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra 
note 19. 
32 Id.   
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required for leases associated with oil exploration.33  This question 
was answered in 1978, when Congress amended the OCSLA.34  The 
amendments require an environmental review for all leases that are a 
major federal action and concern the development and exploration of 
oil.35  Furthermore, states can review this action and the 
environmental reports based on the Coastal Zone Management Act.36   
In 1982, the Secretary of the Interior created the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS).37  MMS is the administrative agency 
that oversees leasing of the submerged outer continental shelf lands 
and offshore oil drilling operations.38  The MMS analyzes the 
environmental review statement and ensures that states have notice of 
and the opportunity to review the leasing proposal.39  Before granting 
a lease for offshore oil drilling, MMS must consider the alternatives 
to the leasing proposal, the environmental impact of the drilling, and 
whether the lease will comply with state regulations.40  In the event 
that the lease expires or the oil rig no longer produces oil, the lease 
agreement and current law require that the oil rig structure be 
completely removed, both below and above the water, and that the 
seabed be returned to its prior natural state.41 
 
B.  Development of the Rigs-To-Reef Project 
 
The Rigs-to-Reef Project was created by the MMS in an 
attempt to support the National Artificial Reef Plan (NARP) created 
under the National Fishing Enforcement Act of 1984 (NFEA).42  
                                                          
33 See Rothbach, supra note 7, at 286. 
34 Id.  
35 Id.; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1351(f) (2000). 
36 43 U.S.C. § 1351(h)(1) (2000). 
37 OCS Lands Act History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra 
note 19. 
38 Id. 
39 U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL 
AND GAS RESOURCES: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, supra note 5, at 17, 21. 
40 Id. 
41 Hecht, supra note 22. 
42 Rigs-to-Reefs Information: What is Rigs-to-Reefs and how does it relate 
to the mission of the Minerals Management Service (MMS)?, BUREAU OF OCEAN 
ENERGY MGMT., REG. AND ENFORCEMENT, 
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NFEA sought to prevent fish degradation within the United States 
coastal waters.43  As part of NFEA, the Federal Government 
established an artificial reef program under NARP.44  NARP sought 
to “promote and facilitate responsible and effective artificial reef use 
based on the best scientific information available” in order to sustain 
and potentially increase the fish and marine life populations in 
coastal waters.45  These artificial reefs were intended to create 
abundant recreational and commercial fishing areas in coastal 
waters.46  The Act provides that the Secretaries of Commerce and 
Army Corps of Engineers shall administer, monitor, and encourage 
the development of the artificial reefs.47  Generally, coastal states 
have been enthusiastic about implementing NARP, and the states are 
                                                          
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/environ/rigs-to-
reefs/information.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011), [hereinafter What is Rigs-to-
Reefs].  
43 See Rothbach, supra note 7, at 287. 
44 Pub. L. No. 98-623, § 204, 98 Stat. 3395 (1984). 
45 National Artificial Reef Plan (as Amended): Guidelines for Siting, 
Construction, Development, and Assessment of Artificial Reefs, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE AND NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., at 1–2 (2007), 
available at 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/PartnershipsCommunications/NARPwCover3.pdf 
[hereinafter National Artificial Reef Plan]. 
46 33 U.S.C.A. § 2102 (2011). 
47 National Artificial Reef Plan, supra note 45, at vi.  The Secretary of 
Commerce oversees the Artificial Reef Plan, which provides guidance to states and 
organizations that want to create artificial reefs in the coastal waters and along the 
outer continental shelf.  Id.  The Army Corps of Engineers issues the actual permits 
for the artificial reefs, and thus the Secretary of the Army must 
 
consult with and consider the views of appropriate local, state, 
and federal agencies and other interested parties; ensure that the 
provisions for siting, constructing, monitoring, and managing 
artificial reefs are consistent with established criteria and 
standards; and ensure that the title to the artificial reef 
construction material is unambiguous and that responsibility for 
maintenance and the financial ability to assume liability is clearly 
established. 
 
Id.   
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working with the Army Corps of Engineers to meet the requirements 
of the Plan in order to effectively create the artificial reefs.48 
 
C.  Implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Program  
 
The success of NARP encouraged the MMS to adopt the 
national Rigs-to-Reefs Project.49  The Project allows for partial rather 
than complete removal of oil rig platforms whose leases have expired 
or that no longer produce oil.50   The remaining parts of the platform 
                                                          
48 Id.  Due to the state cooperation and implementation in creating 
artificial reefs, the National Artificial Reefs Plan is generally considered to be a 
success.  Id. at 2. 
49 What is Rigs-to-Reefs, supra note 42.  In 1993 and again in 1998, the 
MMS announced its support for the artificial reef program and encouraged the 
continued development of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  See LES DAUTERIVE, RIGS-TO-
REEFS POLICY, PROGRESS, AND PERSPECTIVE OCS REPORT MMS 2000-073, 2 
(2000). 
 
The MMS supports and encourages the reuse of obsolete offshore 
petroleum structures as artificial reefs in U.S. waters.  The 
structure must not pose an unreasonable impediment to future 
mineral development.  The reuse RTR plan must comply with the 
artificial reef permitting requirements of the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and the criteria in the National Artificial Reef Plan.  
The state agency responsible for managing marine fisheries 
resources must accept liability for the structure before MMS will 




50 Hecht, supra note 22.  All federal leases that authorized the oil drilling 
and exploration required complete removal of the drilling platform and 
reestablishment of the seabed to its condition prior to drilling.  Id.  In order to 
return the seabed to its condition prior to drilling, the oil company must completely 
remove the drilling platform both above and below the water, seal all oil and 
natural gas wells, and either remove or treat the shell mounds.  Id.  Shell mounds 
refer to debris that has fallen from the oil rig platform and has been covered by 
shells and other marine life overtime.  Id.  The shell mounds often contain drilling 
byproducts such as hydrocarbons or metals; thus, the shell mounds must be 
removed entirely or treated in order to prevent the byproducts from contaminating 
the marine environment overtime.  Id.  The Rigs-to-Reef program provides an 
alternative to complete removal for qualifying offshore oil drilling sites.  Id. 
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are then converted into artificial reefs.51 
The MMS allows for three options when an oil-drilling site 
qualifies for partial, rather than complete, removal.52  The first form 
of removal is the Tow and Place Platform where a cable is attached 
to the remaining rig structure, and then a boat tows the structure to 
the designated location where the rig is then submerged.53  The next 
option for partial removal is the Topple In Place Platform, where the 
platform remains in the same location as it previously stood at the 
drilling site and is simply toppled on its side so that the remaining 
portion of the platform is completely submerged.54  The third option 
is the Partial Removal In Place Platform, which requires the oil 
company to remove a certain portion of the platform, typically any 
part of the platform above a certain depth and any portion above 
water.55  The remaining part of the platform is completely submerged 
and left at the drilling site.56  When a site qualifies for partial 
removal, either the MMS (if the rig was located in federal waters) or 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (if the rig was located within state 
waters) will determine which method will comply most with the 
objectives of NARP.57 
The MMS recognized that using explosives in the removal 
process was likely to be detrimental to the marine environment that 
the Rigs-to-Reef Project was attempting to preserve.  Therefore, the 
MMS created the option for oil companies to allow the well 
conductors to remain intact up to the same depth that the platform 
jacket would remain intact.58  The MMS provided this option after 
                                                          
51 DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 3.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. at Figure 4.  
54 Id. at Figure 5. 
55 Id. at Figure 6. 
56 DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at Figure 6. 
57 Id. at 2–3.  Both the MMS and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers are 
concerned with ensuring that the least damage possible is done to the marine 
environment when the decommissioning and partial removal takes place; thus, the 
method of removal must be determined on a case-by-case basis.  See Hecht, supra 
note 22. 
58 Artificial Reefs: Oases for Marine Life in the Gulf, BUREAU OF OCEAN 
ENERGY 
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conducting a study to find the depth at which a well conductor’s 
structural integrity would likely fail.59  After determining this depth, 
the MMS concluded that allowing the retention of the well 
conductors at the same depth as the platform jacket would not 
increase the potential for structural failure.60  By allowing the well 
components to remain intact at the specified depth, the MMS 
eliminated the need for explosives in the removal process, thus 
minimizing the impact the removal process would have on marine 
life around the oil drilling site.61 
Not all oil rigs qualify for partial removal under the Rigs-to-
Reef Project.  To determine eligibility, coastal states must first 
submit artificial reef development plans to the MMS for approval.62  
Since coastal states create the initial artificial reef plan, oil and gas 
companies who want to donate their obsolete oil and gas rigs to the 
Rigs-to-Reef Project are forced to cooperate with the states in the 
planning and implementation of the decommissioning process.63  
                                                          
 MGMT., REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/environ/rigs-to-reefs/artificial-
reefs.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). 
By allowing the oil companies to leave the well conductors intact at a 
certain depth, the MMS essentially eliminated the need for the use of explosives 
during the removal process, as explosives are not necessary to remove the 
shallower portions of the well conductors or other remaining parts of the oil 
platforms.  
59 DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 4.  The study showed that the well 
conductor would likely fail at -16 feet below the mud line.  Id. 
60 Id.  The MMS requires that the platform jacket be removed up to a 
depth of -150 feet below the mud line.  This depth is much greater than the depth at 
which the study found structural failure was likely to occur.  Thus, allowing the 
retention of the well components at the same depth as the platform jacket should 
not create additional environmental concerns associated with partial removal as the 
structural integrity will not be affected by the toppling of the remaining portions of 
the oil platform.  Id. 
61 Id.  
62 What is Rigs-to-Reefs, supra note 42.  The artificial reef plans that 
coastal states must submit to the MMS if the state wants to participate in the Rigs-
to-Reef Project in order to create artificial reefs in its coastal waters must be state-
specific and identify offshore areas and specific sites suitable for artificial reefs and 
the potential decommissioning of oil and gas platforms.  Id.  
63 Id.  In order to submit the artificial reef plans, state officials must 
determine whether the state wants to acquire a decommissioned oil or gas drilling 
structure as part of its artificial reef plan.  Id.  If the state determines that it does 
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Once the planning process is complete and the structure is donated to 
the state, the state accepts the title and responsibility for the structure 
as an artificial reef.64 
The Rigs-to-Reef Project has experienced only moderate 
success in terms of state implementation.65  Implementation has been 
limited to decommissioned oil and gas drilling sites in the Gulf of 
Mexico.66  However, even the states that have implemented the 
Project have limited implementation. 67  This is largely a result of the 
controversy surrounding the Project. 
 
D.  The Debate Surrounding the Rigs-to-Reef Project 
 
The partial decommissioning of the oil and gas platforms has 
polarized supporters and opponents of the Project, and created a 
continuing debate. 68  The debate concerns the legal, policy, and 
environmental issues associated with the Rigs-to-Reef Project. 69  
                                                          
want to acquire the structure, and thus participate in the Rigs-to-Reef Project, the 
state officials then work with the oil or gas company that owns the structure to 
meet the permit requirements of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers who oversee 
the permitting process allowing for participation in the Rigs-to-Reef project.  Id.  
The state officials and oil or gas company agents will then negotiate the terms of 
the donation of donating the structure to the state.  What is Rigs-to-Reefs, supra 
note 42. 
64 Id. 
65 DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 3.  As of the end of 1999, 1,879 oil and 
gas platforms were no longer producing gas or oil and were scheduled for 
decommissioning.  Id. at 4.  Of these platforms 1,728 were completely removed 
from the coastal waters of the Gulf of Mexico.  Id.  Thus, 151, or less than 1%, of 
the oil and gas rigs were accepted for and donated to the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  Id.  
Of these 151 platforms, Louisiana accepted 94 oil and gas platform donations, and 
Texas accepted 50 donations.  Id. at 3, Table 1.  Therefore, as of the end of 1999 
only two Gulf States have implemented the Rigs-to-Reef Project to a significant 
extent.  
Furthermore as of 2010, state implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project 
had only slightly increased.  See Hecht, supra note 22.  By 2010, 3,000 oil and gas 
drilling platforms had been decommissioned in the Gulf of Mexico; however, only 
260 of these platforms had been accepted and donated to the Rigs-to-Reef Project 
to create artificial reefs.  Id.  
66 DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 3. 
67 Id. at 4. 
68 Hecht, supra note 22; see also What is Rigs-to-Reefs, supra note 42. 
69 Hecht, supra note 22; see also Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288. 
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These concerns have caused various interest groups to adamantly 
support or oppose the Project and have led to unlikely coalitions 
between interest groups that usually have divergent viewpoints.70  
The primary interest groups involved in the debate are oil companies, 
environmental groups, recreational fishermen, and commercial 
fishermen.71  These interest groups are then divided into those who 
oppose and those who support the Project.72  Supporters of the 
Project, the pro side, generally consist of oil companies, certain 
environmental groups and advocates, and recreational fishermen.73  
The opponents, the con side, generally consist of other environmental 
groups and advocates as well as commercial fishermen.74  Although 
the pro and con coalitions have created unlikely coalition 
partnerships,75 each interest group within the pro and con coalitions 
has its own rationale for choosing whether to support or oppose the 
Project.76 
The oil and gas companies, as one of the most significantly 
affected interest groups involved in the Project, support the Project 
for a variety of reasons.77  Prior to the implementation of the Project, 
federal law required oil and gas companies to completely remove all 
obsolete drilling platforms.78  The removal of these platforms was 
extremely expensive for oil and gas companies; thus the Project, 
which allows for partial removal of qualifying oil and gas platforms, 
                                                          
70 Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288.  The debate surrounding the Rigs-to-
Reef Project concerns not only state interests with creating the artificial reefs, but 
also involves the interests of oil companies, environmental groups, and recreational 
and commercial fishermen.  Each of these interest groups has their own concerns 
regarding the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project, and these interest groups 
often create coalitions based on their own concerns in an attempt to persuade the 
state officials to enact the policy most beneficial to their interests.  Id.  
71 Id. at 288–89. 
72 Hecht, supra note 22. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288–89. 
76 Id. at 289. 
77 Id. 
78 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  The Federal Government 
requires the complete removal of all oil and gas drilling rig platforms once the 
platforms become obsolete, and the seabed must be returned to its natural state 
prior to the drilling.  Id. 
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can significantly lower the costs of removal for the oil and gas 
companies.79  Furthermore, the Project provides some flexibility for 
oil and gas companies in their determination of what to do with an 
obsolete oil or gas platform.80  If an obsolete oil or gas platform 
qualifies to become an artificial reef under the Project, the owner of 
the platform can either choose to participate in the Project and donate 
the platform for an artificial reef or comply with federal regulations 
and completely remove the rig platform.81 
The flexibility and lower expense of removal raises concerns 
with opponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.82  Opponents argue that 
it is unfair to provide the oil and gas companies with lower removal 
expenses after they have profited from the oil and gas extracted by 
the platforms.83  Furthermore, opponents also argue that providing 
the oil or gas companies with a reduction in the removal costs after 
                                                          
79 Rothbach, supra note 7, at 289.  With the increasing depth of the oil and 
gas rigs in coastal waters, especially off the California coast, complete removal of 
the rigs can be extremely expensive.  The exact cost depends on a multitude of 
factors including the method used to remove the structure, the method and location 
of the disposal or recycling of the structural debris, and whether or not the shell 
mounds that develop around the submerged portions of the structure have to be 
decontaminated or removed in addition to the oil or gas rig structure.  Hecht, supra 
note 22.  Experts have estimated that the cost of removing the twenty-seven oil rigs 
scheduled for decommissioning off of the California coast will be over one billion 
dollars.  Id.  The partial removal allowed by the Rigs-to-Reef Project significantly 
reduces the cost of removal as it allows the oil or gas company to leave the lower 
portions of the oil or gas well intact, and only requires that the well be sealed and 
the upper portion of the platform be removed.  Id.  Thus, the oil or gas companies 
can potentially limit the expense of the removal process depending on whether the 
decommissioned rig qualifies for the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  Id. 
80 Rothbach, supra note 7, at 289. 
81 Id.  The flexibility provided by the Rigs-to-Reef Project allows oil and 
gas companies more options than were historically available after an oil or gas rig 
became obsolete.  Thus, the companies can determine which choice is most 
beneficial depending on the specific rig being decommissioned.  Id. 
82 Id.  See also Hecht, supra note 22. 
83 Hecht, supra note 22.  The oil and gas rigs often produce large amounts 
of oil or gas before becoming obsolete as the leases provided for the drilling sights 
are for significant amounts of time, and only after an oil or gas rig has stopped 
producing oil or gas does the rig become obsolete and subject to decommissioning 
and removal.  Thus, opponents argue that because the oil or gas companies have 
significantly profited from the oil or gas rigs, they should not be provided with a 
reduction in the removal cost.  Id. 
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the leases for the drilling site have been signed is inequitable.84  
Generally the leases for the drilling sites include removal provisions 
requiring the complete removal of the oil or gas platform.85  Thus, oil 
and gas companies are aware of the removal requirements upon 
signing the lease and have assumingly budgeted for the expensive 
removal process.86  The cost benefit provided to oil and gas 
companies associated with removal expenses remains the main 
concern that opponents to the Rigs-to-Reef Project raise regarding 
the benefits afforded to oil companies; however, the oil companies 
are not the only proponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project. 
The Rigs-to-Reef Project has divided environmental groups 
and advocates, as some remain proponents of the Project while others 
adamantly oppose it.87  Those who support the Rigs-to-Reef Project 
argue that oil and gas platforms attract marine life, and thus removal 
of the platforms would disturb the marine environment that has 
developed around the platform.88  Furthermore, studies have shown 
that complete removal of the oil or gas rig platforms may be more 
detrimental to the marine mammals, bird populations, and water and 
air quality, at least in the short term, rather than partial removal.89  
                                                          
84 Rothbach, supra note 7, at 289. 
85 Id. 
86 Id.  Opponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project assert that because the oil 
and gas companies knew about the removal requirements when they signed the oil 
or gas drilling leases, it is unnecessary and inequitable to reduce the removal costs 
after the leases have been signed, and the companies have profited from the rigs.  
Id. at 291.  
87 Id. at 290–91.  The scientific research surrounding the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project is not entirely conclusive as to whether the partial removal benefits or 
harms the marine environments because the long-term effects of the artificial reefs 
created by the oil and gas rig platforms are still unknown.  Hecht, supra note 22.  
The inconclusiveness of the scientific research is the main cause of the split in the 
environmental community in regards to opposition or support for the Project.  Id. 
88 Id.  Though the environmental studies are inconclusive, the proponents 
of the Rigs-to-Reef Project rely on studies showing that the oil and gas platforms in 
coastal waters have increased fish populations within the surrounding area.  Some 
studies even indicate that the rigs have helped to increase the stock of fish that were 
previously declining before the rigs were placed in the marine environment.  Id. 
89 BROCK B. BERNSTEIN, CALIFORNIA OCEAN SCIENCE TRUST, 
EVALUATING THE ALTERNATIVES FOR DECOMMISSIONING CALIFORNIA’S OFFSHORE 
OIL AND GAS PLATFORMS: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS TO INFORM STATE POLICY, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6–8 (2007).  The California Natural Resources Agency 
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The complete removal also has an immediate impact on the marine 
life surrounding the oil or gas platform.90  Furthermore, 
environmental proponents of the Project point to higher fish densities 
on the artificial reefs created by the oil and gas platforms than on 
natural reefs. 91  The proponents then argue that higher fish density 
indicates that the oil and gas platforms contribute to the growth of the 
marine environment, and therefore should only be partially 
removed.92  Environmental proponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project 
point to these studies and the impact that complete removal has on 
the marine life and the air and water quality surrounding an oil or gas 
                                                          
partnered with the California Ocean Science Trust in order to conduct a study to 
investigate the environmental and policy issues surrounding alternatives to the 
decommissioning of California’s twenty-seven oil and gas platforms in California’s 
coastal waters.  Id. at i.  The study compared the environmental and policy 
consequences associated with complete and partial removal of the oil and gas 
drilling platforms.  Id. at 3, 5.  The study found that complete removal would likely 
have a more negative impact on marine mammals, bird populations, and water and 
air quality in the short term because of the large equipment used to remove the oil 
and gas platforms.  Id. at 6.  Complete removal of the oil and gas platforms requires 
the use of diesel Heavy Lift Vessels and other support vessels for extended periods 
of time.  Id. at 7.  This equipment releases large quantities of emissions that affect 
both the water and air quality around an oil or gas platform.  Id.  Furthermore, the 
complete removal of the oil or gas rig is a prolonged process causing disruption to 
the marine environment for an extended period of time.  Thus, at least in the short 
term, the environmental impacts of complete removal seem greater than those of 
partial removal.  Id. 
90 Id. at 7–8.  Complete removal requires that all parts of the oil or gas 
platform must be removed and the seabed returned to the condition it was in before 
the oil or gas platform was installed.  The removal includes all submerged portions 
of the rig and those parts below the mud line, the line where the water and seabed 
meet.  See DAUTERIVE, supra note 49.  The complete removal leads to the death of 
all marine organisms attached to the oil or gas platform itself, and leads to the 
dispersal of fish from the area surrounding the rig.  BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 
7–8.  The fish that had previously lived in the artificial reef created by the oil or gas 
rig, and the organisms that attach themselves to the rig platform, will leave the area 
to find other undisturbed reefs.  Id.  During the dispersal process there may be a 
high fish mortality rate as the fish attempt to find new reefs to inhabit.  Id. 
91 BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 7–8.  The California Ocean Science Trust 
study found higher density fish communities with larger fish on the artificial reefs 
created by the oil and gas rigs than on natural reefs.  This remained particularly true 
with rockfish, indicating that the rockfish may be using the artificial reefs created 
by the oil and gas rigs as nursery areas for their young.  Id. 
92 Id. 
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platform, to argue that the complete removal is more detrimental to 
the marine environment than partial removal.93 
However, not all studies support this conclusion drawn by 
environmental proponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  
Environmental groups and advocates who oppose the Project 
concentrate on the uncertainty surrounding the long-term effects that 
partial removal of oil and gas platforms may have on the marine 
environment.94  Environmental opponents to the Rigs-to-Reef Project 
argue that even the California Ocean Science Trust study, which the 
environmental proponents have relied on to assert the benefits of 
partial removal over complete removal, is inconclusive.95  The study 
openly admits that much of the data and conclusions reported in the 
study are drawn from estimates rather than quantitative comparisons 
of various oil or gas platforms.96  Moreover, the environmental 
opponents point to the fact that the study was only intended to be the 
beginning of a continuing process in order to help state officials 
understand the environmental and policy consequences of partial 
                                                          
93 Hecht, supra note 22; see also Rothbach, supra note 7, at 291. 
94 Hecht, supra note 22.  Environmental opponents argue that no studies 
have conclusively shown that the increase in fish populations in areas around oil 
and gas rig platforms will continue over time.  The opponents question whether the 
rigs are contributing to the regional marine habitat or whether the rigs simply 
attract local marine life to one area.  Id.  
95 Id.  The California Ocean Science Trust Study concluded that partial 
removal of oil and gas rigs could potentially benefit marine life by causing fewer 
disturbances of the artificial reefs already developing around the rigs.  See 
BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 7–9.  However, this study only evaluated the 
environmental and policy consequences associated with partial removal down to 
eighty-five feet below sea level.  Id.  Additionally, the study did not evaluate the 
ecological benefits or harms associated with partial removal of any particular oil or 
gas rig platform, but instead reviewed and synthesized previously existing 
scientific and economic information in order to create the report.  Hecht, supra note 
22. 
96 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 8.  The study used data from other 
surveys that had monitored fish populations at oil and gas platforms rather than 
generating its own data regarding the fish populations.  Moreover, the study 
specifically states “data gaps prevented quantitative comparisons of platform 
production to that in other communities and ecosystems in southern California, or 
any rigorous estimate of the overall contribution of platform communities to the 
regional ecosystem.”  Id.  Thus, environmentalist opponents to the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project argue that the study itself recognizes the inconclusiveness of its findings.  
Hecht, supra note 22. 
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versus complete removal of oil and gas platforms.97  Thus, the 
environmental opponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project argue that the 
environmental proponents have misused the study in an attempt to 
generate support for the Project when in actuality the study admits 
that its findings are inconclusive.98 
Environmental proponents and opponents to the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project agree that continued research is necessary in order to settle 
the environmental debate surrounding the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  Both 
sides recognize that the environmental impact of complete or partial 
removal of an oil or gas platform may depend on a case-by-case 
basis.99  Therefore, both opponents and proponents agree that the 
decisions, regarding what type of decommissioning plan is 
appropriate for obsolete oil or gas platforms, must be made on an 
individual basis.100 
There is one more interest group that has divided itself among 
the pro and con coalitions.  The interest group consists of both 
commercial and recreational fishermen.101  Generally, recreational 
fishermen tend to be proponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project, while 
commercial fishermen tend to oppose the Project.102  The recreational 
fishermen are some of the strongest proponents of the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project as seen by the passage of the National Fishing Enhancement 
Act (NFEA).103  The recreational fishermen tend to view the Rigs-to-
Reef Project as a program that will increase the fish populations and 
create localized fishing areas.104  They argue that the artificial reefs 
created by the partial removal allowed by the Rigs-to-Reef Project 
provide a marine environment where large amounts of fish live, thus 
forming a popular recreational fishing area.105  These recreational 
                                                          




101 Rothbach, supra note 7, at 290. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 290.  One of the main objectives of the NFEA was to prevent the 
degradation of fish populations through the creation of artificial reefs.  See Pub. L. 
No. 98-623, § 204, 98 Stat. 3395 (1984); Rothbach, supra note 7; National 
Artificial Reef Plan, supra note 45.  
104 Rothbach, supra note 7, at 289–90. 
105 Id. 
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fishing areas will generate increased revenue for the state, as interest 
in the industry will increase if fish populations are abundant and 
recreational fishing sites are established.106 
Opposing the recreational fishermen and the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project are the commercial fishermen.  Commercial fishermen in 
California have been particularly opposed to the implementation of 
the Rigs-to-Reef Project, as the commercial fishing industry in 
California generally relies on trawlers to catch fish.107  The trawlers 
can easily become caught on underwater structures, which can result 
in damage to fishing equipment.108  Thus, commercial fisherman see 
the partial removal of the oil and gas platforms as potentially 
detrimental to their industry as platforms will become permanent 
underwater structures that their nets can get caught on, not only 
ruining that particular haul of fish, but potentially damaging their 
fishing equipment.109  Furthermore, the commercial fishermen 
partner with environmentalists who oppose the Rigs-to-Reef Project 
and argue that the artificial reefs created by the Rigs-to-Reef Project 
may become subject to fishing pressure that would reduce fish 
populations after the oil or gas platform was decommissioned and 
donated to the Rigs-to-Reef Project.110  The commercial fishermen 
                                                          
106 Id.  Recreational fishing generates a significant amount of revenue for 
states as demonstrated by the estimate that recreational fishing contributed nearly 
five billion dollars to the California economy in the 1992 fiscal year.  Id. 
107 Id.  Trawlers “are nets towed at various depths to catch fish or 
shellfish.  Trawl nets, which can be as large as a football field, are either dragged 
along the sea floor or midway between the floor and the surface.”  Fishing & 
Farming Methods: Trawls and dredges, MONTEREY BAY AQUARIUM SEAFOOD 
WATCH, 
http://www.montereybayaquarium.org/cr/cr_seafoodwatch/sfw_gear.aspx#trawling 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2012). 
108 Rothbach, supra note 7, at 290. 
109 Id. 
110 BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 8.  The commercial fishermen and 
environmentalist opponents point to the California Ocean Science Trust study 
which specifically stated that one of the risks of partial removal would be that the 
artificial reefs created by the platforms would be subject to fishing pressures with 
little, if any, restrictions.  Id.  The study explains that any restrictions placed on the 
artificial reefs by the California Department of Fish and Game would only be 
applicable to state vessels and not international or non-state fishing vessels.  Also, 
any fishing restrictions could be considered contrary to the National Fishing 
Enactment Act, which helped lead to the development of the Rigs-to-Reefs Project, 
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are concerned that over fishing of these artificial reefs could 
negatively impact the commercial fishing industry.111 
Though each of the interest groups, including the oil 
companies, environmental groups, and fishermen, has its own 
concerns and agenda for choosing whether to support or oppose the 
Rigs-to-Reef Project, certain legal and policy considerations affect all 
interested parties.112  The conversion of an obsolete oil or gas 
platform into an artificial reef involves a complicated legal and 
regulatory process.113  States must first create legislation that allows 
them to accept ownership of an artificial reef located in federal 
waters.114  Even if this legislation is created, questions still exist as to 
the potential liability associated with assuming responsibility for a 
decommissioned oil or gas platform as part of the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project.115  This liability question has been addressed to some extent 
by requiring oil and gas companies who participate in the Rigs-to-
Reef Project to donate half of their removal cost savings, the cost 
difference between partial and complete removal of the oil or gas 
platform, to the state that accepts ownership of the artificial reef and 
decommissioned oil or gas platform.116  In addition to this debate 
                                                          
as one of the primary purposes of NFEA is to create artificial reefs to improve 
fishing.  Id.   
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 9–10. 
113 Id. at 9.  
114 Id. at 10.  Some states, particularly those located along the Gulf of 
Mexico have created legislation that allows them to accept ownership of the 
artificial reefs in federal waters.  Thus, California may want to look at the 
legislative acts of these states, especially Texas and Louisiana, before enacting its 
own legislation.  See DAUTERIVE, supra note 49. 
115 BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 10.  The Rigs-to-Reef Project has 
generated some concern over the liability that states are potentially assuming when 
accepting ownership of the artificial reefs created from decommissioned and 
partially removed oil and gas platforms.  Some opponents to the Rigs-to-Reef plan 
assert that oil and gas companies are escaping any future liability for leaks or spills 
that may occur in the future, and passing this liability off to the states.  See 
DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 4. 
116 See DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 4.  The money that the oil companies 
are required to donate to the state accepting ownership of the decommissioned oil 
or gas rig platform serves two purposes.  The money pays for the upkeep of the 
artificial reef and provides a fund that will cover at least some of the liability costs 
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surrounding the Rigs-to-Reef Project and the legal and policy 
considerations associated with the Project, the oil and gas drilling 
platforms in California have additional characteristics that cause the 
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California to be more 
complicated.117 
 
E.  Critical Differences Between Implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project in the Gulf States and California 
 
There are distinct differences between the California and Gulf 
Coast marine environments and offshore oil and natural gas drilling 
sites.118  These differences must be taken into consideration when 
reviewing the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in 
California.119  The first main difference between California and the 
Gulf States is the topography of the coast and the seabed.120  The 
offshore oil and natural gas platforms in the Gulf Coast are primarily 
located in the northern portion of the Gulf of Mexico.121  The seabed 
of the Gulf Coast, particularly the northern area where the oil and gas 
platforms are located, is primarily composed of clay, silt, or sand.122  
With this composition, the Gulf of Mexico has few natural reefs, and 
the few natural reefs that do exist are located seventy-five or more 
                                                          
associated with ownership of the artificial reefs.  Id.; see also Rothbach, supra note 
7, at 293. 
117 Hecht, supra note 22. 
118 ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING OF CALIFORNIA’S 
OFESHORE PRODUCTION PLATFORMS, SELECT SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON 
DECOMMISSIONING UNIV. OF CAL., at 22 (2008), available at 
 www.coastalresearchcenter.ucsb.edu/cmi/files/decommreport.pdf [hereinafter 
ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING]. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id.  There are several thousand oil and gas drilling platforms located in 
the northern portion of the Gulf Coast.  Thus, the oil and gas production in the Gulf 
Coast is highly concentrated to this particular area, whereas the oil and gas 
production off the California coast is more widespread.  Id. at 8, 22. 
122 Id. at 22.  There are a few natural rock reefs near the shore off of the 
coast of Louisiana and Texas.  However, it has been estimated that only about 1.6% 
of the Gulf Coast area consists of hard bottom and reef habitats.  Id. 
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miles from shore.123  Thus, the topography of the Gulf of Mexico has 
been a key factor in encouraging the Gulf States to create artificial 
reefs, especially through the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project.124 
On the other hand, the topography of the California coast and 
seabed is largely rocky.125  The natural rocky seabed allows for the 
development of natural reefs that can sustain marine reefs and fish 
populations.126  Furthermore, oil and gas production off the 
California coast remains more limited than in the Gulf of Mexico.127  
Rather than the thousands of oil and gas platforms concentrated in 
the northern part of the Gulf Coast, California only has a total of 
twenty-seven offshore oil and gas platforms scattered throughout 
both the federal and state waters.128  As California’s offshore oil and 
gas platforms are not concentrated in one area, unlike the Gulf of 
                                                          
123 ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 118, 
at 22. 
124 Id. at 23.  The numerous oil and gas platforms in the northern part of 
the Gulf of Mexico provide rock-like structures on which reefs can develop.  With 
the abundance of these structures and the lack of hard bottom and reef habitats, the 
oil and gas platforms have provided the Gulf States with a means to create artificial 
reefs in order to increase fish reef populations.  Id.   
125 Id. at 22.  California’s coastal seabed is primarily made up of rocky 
reef habitat with large areas of rocky intertidal and shallow sub tidal habitats.  Id. 
126 Id.  Unlike the Gulf States, California’s topography allows for the 
development of natural reefs on the rocky seabed.  Thus, California does not have 
to depend on the oil and gas platforms to create reefs.  Id. 
127 Id. at 22.  California outlawed offshore oil drilling after the Santa 
Barbara Oil Spill of 1969.  See Hecht, supra note 22; Clarke, supra note 24.  Then, 
in 1984, the Federal Government outlawed new offshore oil drilling platforms off 
the coast of California.  See Hecht, supra note 22.  The combination of the state 
and federal action essentially outlawing offshore oil drilling off the California 
coast, prevented oil and gas production from rising to the same level as seen in the 
Gulf of Mexico.  ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 
118, at 22. 
128 ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 118, 
at 23–24.  The twenty-seven offshore oil and gas platforms are distributed in state 
and federal waters across four general regions of the California coastline; the four 
regions include the northern region by Point Conception, East Santa Barbara 
Channel, West Santa Barbara Channel, and Orange County.  Id. at 8. 
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Mexico, the platform’s impact on the marine life and fish populations 
is more difficult to determine.129   
In addition to the topography, the Gulf Coast and California 
also differ in their marine environments.  The waters of the Gulf of 
Mexico are populated by different species of fish than California.130  
Various environmental studies have indicated that oil and gas 
platforms have potentially increased the fish populations around the 
oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico.131  However, the results 
from these studies cannot be considered overly persuasive when used 
to evaluate the impact that California oil and gas platforms would 
have on fish populations.132  The difference in the fish species that 
populate the two geographic regions indicates that the environmental 
impact of implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California may 
drastically differ from the results of the implementation of the Project 
in the Gulf of Mexico.133  Moreover, the oil and gas platforms off of 
the California coast are located in much deeper water than the oil and 
gas platforms in the Gulf Coast.134  Thus many of the oil and gas 
                                                          
129 Each of the four regions where California’s offshore gas and oil 
platforms are located is characterized by unique water temperatures, current 
conditions, and seabed compositions that affect the marine environments of each 
area.  Id.  For example, the northern region by Point Conception is characterized by 
colder water, a strong southern flowing current, and a rocky reef seabed, while the 
southern portion of the Orange County area has warmer water with northern 
flowing currents and mix of sandy and rocky seabed.  Id.  These varying conditions 
have “important implications for the kinds of species inhabiting platforms and the 
degree to which platforms contribute to regional abundance of hard bottom 
habitat.”  Id. at 8. 
130 Id. at 23. 
131 Id. at 7–8.   
132 Id. at 23.  Almost every environmental study evaluating the 
environmental impact of decommissioned oil and gas platforms has been conducted 
by looking at the fish populations of the Gulf Coast.  This is partially due to the fact 
that the Gulf States have been one of the only areas to allow widespread 
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  Id.  
133 ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 118, 
at 23.  In determining the impact of the decommissioning of oil and gas platforms 
on different species of fish, the differences in the fish species’ “life history, 
mobility, longevity, . . . [and] harvesting pressures” associated with the specific 
geographic region must be considered.  Id.  
134 Hecht, supra note 22.  Many of California’s oil and gas platforms are 
located in water that is over 400 feet deep, with some sitting as deep as 1,000 feet.  
See also ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 118, at 
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platforms scheduled for decommissioning off the California coast 
would be the first deep water platforms to be decommissioned.135  
Considering these differences between the regions of the Gulf Coast 
and the California coast, the results of implementing the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project in the Gulf States may not be representative of the impact of 
implementing the Project in California.136 
 
II.  CALIFORNIA’S INITIAL ATTEMPTS TO IMPLEMENT THE 
RIGS-TO-REEF PROJECT 
 
A.B. 2503 was not the first attempt by the California 
Legislature to implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  Over more than a 
decade, the California Legislature has introduced three separate bills 
in an attempt to implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project.137  Only the 
third, and most recent bill, A.B. 2503, was successful.138 
 
A. S.B. 2173 
 
The first attempt to implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project in 
California occurred in 1998 with S.B. 2173.139  The bill proposed to 
extend California’s artificial reef program in both state and federal 
                                                          
9.  Of all the oil and gas platforms that have been decommissioned in the Gulf of 
Mexico or the North Sea, no fixed platform has been decommissioned that is at a 
depth of more than 400 feet.  Hecht, supra note 22. 
135 Hecht, supra note 22. 
136 Id.; see also ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING, 
supra note 118, at 23. 
137 Hecht, supra note 22.   
138 Id.  In late August 2010, the California Legislature passed A.B. 2503.  
On September 30, 2010, Governor Schwarzenegger signed the bill into law.  Id.  
Thus, it was finally possibe to begin implementing the Rigs-to-Reefs Project in 
California. 
139 MICHAEL VINCENT MCGINNIS ET AL., THE POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND 
ECOLOGY OF DECOMMISSIONING OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS STRUCTURES, MMS OCS 
STUDY 2001-006 65 (2001) (provided by MMS Cooperative Agreement Number 
14-35-0001-30761), available at http://ocpc.msi.ucsb.edu/pdfs/WTPap6/WP6.pdf.  
S.B. 2173 did not directly refer to the Rigs-to-Reef Project, but the bill 
incorporated many of the technical and policy elements of the Project, in essence, 
indirectly attempting to implement the national Rigs-to-Reef Project in California.  
Id. at 65–66. 
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waters to the Outer Continental Shelf.140  The bill originally focused 
on the impact the artificial reefs would have on the recreational and 
commercial fishing industries.141  This approach, however, was 
quickly modified, and S.B. 2173 was amended to focus on the 
potential environmental benefits that extending the artificial reef 
program could have on protecting marine environments and 
increasing fish populations.142  By amending S.B. 2173, Senator 
McPherson hoped to gain more support for the bill by incorporating 
the values of a wider political spectrum.143 
S.B. 2173 also addressed some of the liability and political 
concerns associated with extending the artificial reef program.144  
One of the main concerns about the extension of the artificial reef 
program was that the expansion of the program would be hindered by 
budget and political constraints.145  In order to address these 
concerns, the bill suggested the development of an artificial reef 
program account, and a supplementary fund to be administered by 
                                                          
140 Id.  Senator Bruce McPherson proposed S.B. 2173 after recognizing 
that a decline in California’s marine life was having a detrimental impact on the 
recreational and commercial fishing industries.  Senator McPherson believed that 
extending the artificial reef program would increase the fish population and limit 
the impact on the fishing industries.  Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id.  The amended bill did not completely depart from its focus on the 
impact the expansion of the artificial reef program could have on recreational and 
commercial fishing; instead, the amended bill discussed the potential for the 
artificial reefs to protect and increase fish populations, which would in turn benefit 
the commercial and recreational fishing industries that were vital to the California 
economy.  Id. 
143 Id. at 66.  The bill was reframed to focus on preserving and promoting 
the California marine resources.  There was still a substantial focus on sustaining 
fish populations for recreation and commercial fishing; however, by making the 
main concern the marine resources and environment, Senator McPherson hoped to 
gain support from other political groups besides commercial and recreational 
fishing lobbyists.  Id. 
144 MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 66.  
145 Id.  S.B. 2173 called for the extension of California’s artificial reef 
program into federal waters.  This extension of the reefs could potentially be very 
costly to implement and upkeep.  Thus, the legislature was extremely concerned 
about the long-term budgetary impact of the bill.  Furthermore, the extension would 
also require increased supervision of the project, particularly regarding the 
allocation of funds for the upkeep of the artificial reefs.  This need for increased 
supervision could lead to political constraints on the program.  Id. 
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California Endowment for the Preservation of Marine Resources.146  
Furthermore, S.B. 2173 also required that the oil or gas company that 
owned and operated the offshore drilling platform contribute ten 
percent of the removal cost savings into the artificial reef account.147  
If the state accepted liability of the oil or natural gas rig, however, the 
oil or gas company was required to allocate fifty percent of its 
removal cost savings.148 
 
B.  Analysis of S.B. 2173 
 
Despite its initial amendments to the bill’s focus149 and the 
additional budget and policy considerations, S.B. 2173 failed to gain 
support and was tabled early in the 1998 legislative session.150  One 
reason for the lack of support may have been the way that the bill 
was initially proposed.  The initial focus on preserving fish 
populations in order to promote recreational and commercial fishing 
within California caused the potential benefits to the marine 
environment to seem like a secondary concern.151  This may have 
prevented environmental groups and lobbyists from fully supporting 
the extension of California’s artificial reefs program.  Thus, without 
the environmentalists’ support, S.B. 2173’s only main lobbyists were 
                                                          
146 Id.  In 1985, the California Fish and Game Code appropriated $500,000 
to California’s artificial reef program.  Id.  Proponents of S.B. 2173 feared that this 
appropriation would prevent further funding from being allocated to the extension 
of the artificial reef program.  Thus, by creating a separate account specifically for 
the artificial reef program and establishing an agency, California Endowment for 
the Preservation of Marine Resources, to oversee the allocation of the funds in this 
account, the bill sought to alleviate some of the budgetary and political fears 
surrounding the expansion of the program.  Id. at 66. 
147 Id. at 66.  By requiring the oil and gas companies to contribute a 
portion of their removal cost savings to the state artificial reef program account, the 
bill provided a means of generating additional income in order to implement the 
extension and upkeep of the artificial reef program.   
148 Id.  By requiring the oil and gas companies to allocate an additional 
fifty percent to the state artificial reef program account if the state assumed liability 
for the decommissioned oil or natural gas platform, the bill attempted to generate 
additional funds that would be available if any long-term liability issues arose with 
the extension of the artificial reef program.   
149 See supra note 142–143. 
150 MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 66. 
151 See supra note 142–143. 
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those representing recreational and commercial fishermen.  Though 
these lobby groups remain fairly strong and influential within 
California’s legislature,152 the support of these groups alone was not 
sufficient to persuade legislators to extend the artificial reef program 
considering the potential policy and budgetary ramifications of the 
extension.   
Furthermore, attempting to implement the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project in California through S.B. 2173 was likely premature.  
Though the Federal Government created the Rigs-to-Reef Project in 
1984,153 by 1999, the Project was only beginning to be implemented 
by the Gulf States.154  The Gulf States have been significantly more 
willing to implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project than California.  Thus, 
considering that by 1998 the Rigs-to-Reef Project was only being 
implemented at a minimal level by the Gulf States, it is not surprising 
that when S.B. 2173 was introduced in 1998, it was met with 
skepticism and limited support.155  Though the bill attempted to 
account for some of the budget and policy concerns associated with 
the Rigs-to-Reef Project,156 these fears were simply too pervasive and 
the Project too new to receive widespread support from the California 
Legislature.  Therefore, it is not surprising that California’s first 
attempt to implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project failed.157 
 
                                                          
152 See Rothbach, supra note 7, at 290.  Recreational fisherman remain one 
of the strongest supporters of the Rigs-to-Reef Project and have been one the most 
active lobbyist groups to encourage implementation of the Project in California.  Id. 
153 See What is Rigs-to-Reefs, supra note 42.   
154 See supra note 65.  The Gulf States have been the most willing to 
implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project; however, even with this willingness, the 
implementation has been slow.  By 1999, less than one percent of the 
decommissioned oil and natural gas drilling platforms in the Gulf of Mexico had 
been accepted and donated to the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  Id.  
155 California, only recently began implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project 
with the passage of A.B. 2503; the Gulf States, on the other hand, began 
implementing the Project as early as 1987.  See DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 3.   
156 See supra note 146–148. 
157 Not only did S.B. 2173 fail to become a law, it never even reached the 
legislative floor; instead S.B. 2173 was tabled while still in its legislative 
committee.  See Hecht, supra note 22.   
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C. S.B. 241/S.B 1 
 
The California Legislature’s next attempt to implement the 
Rigs-to-Reef Project occurred shortly after S.B. 2173 failed.  Senator 
Dede Alpert originally attempted to revive S.B. 2173, but when this 
failed, he introduced a new bill, S.B. 241, in 2000.158  Senator Alpert 
modeled S.B 241 after S.B. 2173, and adopted many of its 
provisions.159  With S.B. 241, however, Senator Alpert sought to 
focus more on the technical feasibility, the potential environmental 
impact, and the budgetary and policy considerations associated with 
implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project.160 
With regards to the technical feasibility of implementing the 
Rigs-to-Reef Project in California, S.B. 241 asserted that 
implementation of the Project was feasible because implementing the 
Project had been discussed previously, and California already had an 
artificial reef program.161  S.B. 241 established the California 
Department of Fish and Game as the primary state agency 
responsible for overseeing the implementation and management of 
the artificial reefs; however, other state agencies would also be 
involved in the process.162  The importance S.B. 241 placed on 
                                                          
158 MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 66–67.  Originally Senator Alpert 
attempted to revive S.B. 2173 in January of 1999; however, he was once again 
unable to garner a significant amount of support or interest in S.B. 2173, and thus, 
the bill was tabled in April of 1999.  Id.  Recognizing that the S.B. 2173 would 
need to be significantly amended in order to progress any further, Senator Alpert 
drafted a new bill, modeled after S.B. 2173, which he introduced in January 2000.  
Id.  
159 Id. at 67. 
160 Id. 
161 Id.  This assertion, that the Rigs-to-Reef Project was feasible because 
the California Legislature had considered the Project’s implementation, previously 
demonstrates the fact that S.B. 241 was modeled after the failed S.B. 2173. 
162 Id. at 67.  By giving the primary responsibility of overseeing and 
managing the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project to the California 
Department of Fish and Game (CDFG), S.B 241 provided the CDFG with the 
authority to implement the Project.  At the same time, S.B. 241 also established that 
other agencies could also assume some of the burdens associated with 
implementation, including the technical planning and support.  Id.  Furthermore, 
S.B. 241 incentivized these other state agencies to become involved in the 
implementation process with the potential for the agencies to share in the 
management and control of artificial reef program funds.  Id.  
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interagency coordination and cooperation of the implementation 
process was one of the main differences between S.B. 241 and its 
predecessor, S.B. 2173.163  Furthermore, in order to generate 
additional support for S.B 241, Senator Alpert reinforced his 
assertions about the technical feasibility of the implementation of the 
Rigs-to-Reef Project by asking the California State University system 
to scientifically evaluate the environmental concerns associated with 
the Rigs-to-Reef Project.164  By asking for an outside, independent 
perspective, Senator Alpert lent credibility to S.B. 241.165 
S.B. 241 also focused on the potential environmental benefits 
associated with implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project.166  The bill 
sought to bring attention to the concept that the oil and gas platforms 
already served as artificial reefs. 167  Artificial reefs develop on the 
platforms; hence, the platforms help to create new marine 
environments, and do not simply attract fish populations from 
                                                          
163 MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 67.  S.B. 241 considered the roles 
that state agencies such as the State Lands Commission, the California Coastal 
Commission, and the Bay Conservation and Development Commission would have 
in the implementation process and addressed how implementation would be 
affected by state and federal laws, including the California Environmental Quality 
Act and the federal Clean Water Act.  Id.  Thus, S.B. 241 took a broader and more 
comprehensive approach to analyzing the technical feasibility of implementing the 
Rigs-to-Reef Project in California. 
164 Id. at 67.  Senator Alpert convened a “Blue Ribbon Panel” through 
which he sought the California State University system’s assistance in determining 
scientific questions that needed to be resolved, evaluating the existing data about 
the impact of the Rigs-to-Reef Project on the marine environment and resources, 
and comparing the partial decommissioning allowed by the Project with other 
decommissioning alternatives.  Id. 
165 One of the main reasons that S.B. 2173 failed to garner sufficient 
support to make it out of its legislative committee was the fact that the bill lacked 
scientific research about the impact of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  Id.  This lack of 
scientific information caused legislators to be skeptical about voting for a bill 
without having information about the long-term effects.   
166 MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 67. 
167 Id.  One of the requirements of the National Fishing Enforcement Act 
(NFEA), which set some of the parameters for the development of artificial reefs, 
was that the materials utilized to create artificial reefs had to be approved by the 
NFEA.  Oil and natural gas platforms had already been approved by the NFEA and 
thus could be used to create artificial reefs without administrative delay or 
additional approval.  Id. at 67. 
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previously existing reefs.168  Moreover, S.B. 241 required that the 
artificial reefs created by implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project be 
designated as marine reserves.169  This requirement to designate the 
artificial reefs as marine reserves emphasized that the focus of S.B. 
241 was on the potential environmental benefits associated with 
implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  With the environmental 
benefits as the focus, S.B. 241 was able to generate a broader support 
base by appealing to public interests beyond commercial and 
recreational fishing.170  
Finally, S.B. 241 attempted to directly address some of the 
budgetary and policy concerns associated with the implementation of 
the Rigs-to-Reef Project.171  As mentioned above, S.B. 241 
advocated interagency cooperation and management of California’s 
artificial reef program.172  Involving multiple agencies in the 
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project would increase the 
validity of the Project and distribute the implementation 
responsibilities across multiple state agencies.173  In regards to the 
budgetary concerns associated with implementation, S.B. 241 
focused on long-term funding for the Project.174  In order to facilitate 
this long-term funding, S.B. 241 called for the creation of an 
Artificial Reef Endowment Fund.175  The bill then required that a 
                                                          
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 67–68.  By designating the artificial reefs developing on the 
decommissioned oil and gas platforms as marine reserves, California could more 
closely monitor the growth and development of the marine environment around 
these artificial reefs, while protecting the developing marine environment from 
over-fishing.  
170 Id. at 68.  Another significant difference between S.B. 241 and S.B. 
2173 was the fact that S.B. 241 framed implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project 
as having a broader impact than simply affecting fish populations.  Thus, a larger 
segment of the California public was likely to take an interest in the bill, which in 
turn helped to generate more support for the bill in the California legislature. 
171 MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 68. 
172 See supra note 161–163 and accompanying text.  
173 MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 66.  By involving multiple state 
agencies in the implementation process, S.B. 241 sought to prevent any one agency 
from becoming overburdened by the implementation process.  Id. 
174 Id. at 68. 
175 Id.  The Artificial Reef Endowment Fund (AREF) would be separate 
from any fund accounts held by the California Department of Fish and Game.  
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portion of the oil or gas companies’ removal cost savings be split 
between the Artificial Reef Endowment Fund and the California 
Department of Fish and Game.176  The depth of the decommissioned 
oil or natural gas platform would determine the proportion of the 
removal cost savings that would be required to be allocated to the 
state agency accounts.177 
Senator Alpert was still in the process of generating support 
for S.B. 241 when the 1999-2000 California Legislative Session 
came to a close.178  Thus, just as with its predecessor S.B. 2173, 
Senator Alpert was forced to table179 S.B. 241 until the debate could 
be renewed in the 2000-2001 legislative session.180  At the start of the 
2000-2001 California legislative Session, Senator Alpert 
reintroduced S.B. 241 as S.B. 1.181  S.B. 1 incorporated the 
adjustments that had been made to S.B. 241,182 and with these 
                                                          
Thus, the funds in the AREF would be solely for upkeep and implementation of the 
Rigs-to-Reef Project.  Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id.  The proportion of the removal cost savings that the oil and gas 
companies would be required to donate to the two stage agency funds would be 
determined based on the depth of the oil or natural gas platform being 
decommissioned; therefore, the deeper the platform being decommissioned, the 
greater the proportion of the removal cost savings that would be allocated to the 
state funds.  Id.  This plan for determining the proportion of removal cost savings 
by depth was designed to offset some of the liability concerns associated with 
California assuming responsibility for the decommissioned oil and gas platforms; 
furthermore, by creating a relationship between the depth of the platform and the 
proportion of removal cost savings allocated to the state funds, S.B. 241 attempted 
to account for the increased cost in maintaining deep artificial reefs.  Id. 
178 MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 68. 
179 Tabling a bill means that the, “motion is not debatable, and agreement 
to the motion is equivalent to defeating the question tabled.  The motion is used to 
dispose quickly of questions the Senate does not wish to consider further.”  See 
Senate Glossary, Motion to Table, UNITED STATES SENATE (Feb. 4, 2012), 
www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/b_three_sections_with_teasers/glossary.htm 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2012). 
180 MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 68, 72. 
181 Complete Bill History, OFFICIAL CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE  
INFORMATION, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-
02/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sb_1_bill_20020110_history.html. 
182 See supra notes 158, 162–173 and accompanying text.  S.B. 1 was 
essentially the same bill as S.B. 241; however, due to the end of the 1999-2000 
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adjustments, S.B. 1 was able to garner enough support to be approved 
by both the California Assembly and Senate.183  After passing both 
houses of the California Legislature, S.B. 1 was submitted to 
Governor Davis to be signed into law.184  Despite having the support 
of both the Assembly and the Senate, S.B. 1 was vetoed by Governor 
Davis.185  Therefore, with the veto of S.B. 1, the second attempt to 
implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California failed.186   
 
D. Analysis of S.B. 241/S.B. 1 
 
Governor Davis explained his veto of S.B 1 by saying that 
“‘[t]here is no conclusive evidence that converted platforms enhance 
marine species or produce net benefits to the environment.’”187  In 
this explanation, Governor Davis is eluding to the lack of scientific 
research that had been done on the impact that implementation of the 
Rigs-to-Reef Project would have on marine environments.  Even 
though both the California Assembly and the Senate passed S.B. 1, 
the bill faced strong opposition from various environmental groups 
and lobbyists.188  This opposition by some environmentalists relates 
to the idea that S.B 1 was attempting to implement the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project in California before scientific research had been conducted on 
the long-term effects of the Project on marine environments.   
The provisions of S.B. 1 themselves evidence the lack of 
scientific data regarding the long-term effects on the marine 
environment.  In order to generate support for the bill, Senator Alpert 
sought the help of the California State University system to evaluate 
                                                          
legislative session, the numbering on the bill was changed when it was 
reintroduced in the 2000-2001 legislative session.  
183 See Hecht, supra note 22; see also Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288. 
184 Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288. 
185 See Hecht, supra note 22. 
186 See id.; see also Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288. 
187 Hecht, supra note 22 (quoting Governor Davis’s explanation of his 
decision to veto S.B. 1). 
188 When S.B. 1 was being debated in both the California Assembly and 
the Senate, the commercial fishermen opposing the bill aligned themselves with 
environmentalists who also opposed the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project.  See Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288.  See supra Part I.D (discussing the 
various parties involved in the debate surrounding the implementation of the Rigs-
to-Reef Project). 
    
Fall 2012 Rigs-to-Reef Project  793 
the environmental concerns and impact associated with implementing 
the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California.189  Though Senator Alpert 
may have had good intentions in creating this “Blue Ribbon Panel,” 
the Panel should have been created before S.B. 1 was written and 
submitted to the Legislature for debate.  The fact that the bill itself 
created the Panel meant that any information provided by the Panel 
could not be incorporated into S.B. 1 before it underwent legislative 
debate.  S.B. 1 did take the first steps toward encouraging 
environmental studies of the long-term impact the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project would have on marine environments.  The bill itself, 
however, did not include any conclusive information showing that 
converting the decommissioned oil and natural gas platforms into 
artificial reefs would benefit the existing marine environment in 
California.   
One of the main reasons that S.B. 1 only suggested that 
environmental studies be conducted rather than presenting actual 
scientific data about the impact of the Rigs-to-Reef Project on marine 
environments is that, at the time the bill was proposed, there was 
practically no scientific data available.  S.B. 1 was modeled after S.B. 
241, and proposed in the 2000-2001 legislative session.190  The Rigs-
to-Reef Project only became significantly implemented in the Gulf 
States as of 1999.191  Therefore, the Project had not been 
implemented long enough for scientific studies to evaluate the long-
term effects of the implementation of the Project on the marine 
environments.  Furthermore, the only oil and gas platforms that had 
been decommissioned as artificial reefs through the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project were located in the Gulf of Mexico.192  Any scientific 
information obtained from these decommissioned platforms that 
could have been included in S.B. 1 would be addressing the impact 
                                                          
189 See supra note 163–164. 
190 See supra note 182. 
191 See DAUTERIVE, supra note 49.  In 1987, the first offshore oil platform 
was accepted into the Rigs-to-Reef Project in the Gulf of Mexico.  Id.  Even if 
studies had been done on the impact this decommissioned oil platform had on the 
marine environment, the study would only be measuring the impact of the Rigs-to-
Reef Project over a decade.  A decade can hardly be sufficient to allow for a 
concrete scientific evaluation of the impact of the Project on the marine 
environment. 
192 See DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 63. 
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the Project had on the marine environments of the Gulf of Mexico.  
Therefore, this scientific data would not be convincing given the vast 
differences in topography and marine environments of the Gulf of 
Mexico and California.193   
With S.B. 1 being vetoed based on the lack of concrete 
scientific evidence regarding the long-term effects and potential 
environmental benefits of implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project in 
California, legislative attempts to implement the Project in California 
stalled.  It took almost a decade for the next bill addressing the 
implementation of the Project in California to be proposed in the 
California Legislature. 
 
III.  CALIFORNIA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGS-TO-REEF PROJECT: 
A.B. 2503 
 
In February 2010, Assembly Member John A. Perez proposed 
a new bill, A.B. 2503, which addressed the implementation of the 
Rigs-to-Reef Project in California.194  With this proposal, Assembly 
Member Perez revived the debate surrounding the implementation of 
the Rigs-to-Reef Project.195  A.B. 2503 adopted some of the ideas 
from the previous two bills that proposed the implementation of the 
Project.  However, Assembly Member Perez also recognized that the 
two previous bills failed to gain enough support in order to 
successfully implement the Project.196  Thus, A.B. 2503 included 
                                                          
193 See supra Part I.E. 
194Assembly Bill No. 2503, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION, 
 available at 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200920100AB2
503&search_keywords=#. 
195 The last bill proposing the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project 
in California failed in 2001.  See supra notes 181, 186.  A.B. 2503 was not 
introduced until 2010; therefore, the debate surrounding the implementation of 
Rigs-to-Reef Project in California had received little attention from both legislators 
and the public for almost a decade.  This proposal, however, brought the debate to 
the forefront.  Thus, interested parties once again created alliances and began 
lobbying for and against the bill.  See supra note 70 and accompanying text 
(discussing the development of the coalitions that formed between various 
supporters and opponents of the Project). 
196 Hecht, supra note 22. 
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additional provisions in order to address many of the concerns that 
surround the Rigs-to-Reef Project.197   
Like S.B. 1,198 A.B. 2503 primarily focused on the potential 
environmental benefits associated with implementing the Rigs-to-
Reef Project in California.  A.B. 2503 emphasized the importance of 
preserving the diversity and abundance of the marine life in 
California’s coastal waters.199  The bill then went further to assert 
that the state programs dedicated to preserving California’s marine 
resources were subject to inadequate and unstable funding.200  By 
referencing the lack of funding for the preservation programs, A.B. 
2503 insinuated that by implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project in 
California, greater funding would be available to help preserve the 
marine environments.201  Focusing on the potential environmental 
impact of implementing the Project allowed A.B. 2503 to appeal to 
broader public interests.202  With the greater public interest, 
Assembly Member Perez increased his chances of generating enough 
support to get A.B. 2503 passed in the California Legislature.203 
Furthermore, A.B. 2503 also incorporated the case-by-case 
analysis that had been used in both S.B. 2173 and SB. 1.204  The case-
by-case analysis allowed the state agencies assigned to regulate and 
                                                          
197 Id. 
198 As S.B. 1 replaced S.B. 241 and the two were essentially the same bill, 
S.B. 241 will be referenced as part of S.B. 1 in the following portions of this 
analysis. 
199 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6601 (West 2012).  A.B. 2503 asserted that 
the diversity of species and ecosystems in California’s coastal waters was 
important for the “public health and well-being, ecological health, and ocean-
dependent economic activities.”  Id. 
200 Id. § 6601(b). 
201 Id. § 6601(g).  The portion of the removal cost savings allowing for the 
partial removal of the decommissioned oil and natural gas platforms could be 
allocated to the maintenance and enhancement of the artificial reefs created by the 
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  Id.  Thus, A.B. 2503 could provide 
additional funding for the protection of the marine environments. 
202 Assembly Member Perez probably modeled the focus of A.B. 2503 off 
of S.B. 1 because S.B. 1 was able to garner enough support to pass the California 
legislature by focusing on the potential environmental benefits of implementing the 
Rigs-to-Reef Project.  See supra note 183. 
203 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6601(g). 
204 Id. § 6603. 
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implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California to determine on an 
individual basis which oil and natural gas platforms qualified for the 
partial removal allowed by the Rigs-to-Reef Project.205  This 
provided the state agencies with greater control over the 
implementation process.206  In order to facilitate this case-by-case 
analysis, A.B. 2503 followed S.B. 1’s administrative structure, and 
established an administrative plan that provided for interagency 
cooperation and management of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.207  A.B. 
2503 divided the responsibilities involved in the implementation of 
the Project between three agencies within the California Natural 
Resources Agency.208  The three agencies included the California 
Department of Fish and Game, the California Ocean Protection 
Council, and the California State Lands Commission.209  Though 
each of these subsidiary agencies was responsible for a different part 
of the implementation process, they all reported back to the 
California Natural Resources Agency. 210  Therefore, A.B. 2503 
established the California Natural Resources Agency as the primary 
agency in control of the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project 
in California.211 
Even though the three subsidiary agencies ultimately report to 
the California Natural Resources Agency, each subsidiary agency 
plays an important role in the application review process.  A.B. 2503 
established the California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) as 
the agency responsible for accepting or denying the oil and gas 
companies applications for the Rigs-to-Reef Project.212  In 
determining whether to accept or deny an application, the CDFG 
evaluates whether or not California should accept ownership of the 
                                                          
205 Id.  By forcing each oil and natural gas platform to individually qualify 
for the Rigs-to-Reef Project, A.B. 2503 sought to prevent over implementation of 
the Rigs-to-Reef Project and ensure that the platforms donated to the Project would 
potentially provide environmental benefits.   
206 Id. 
207 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 71530 (West 2010).   
208 Hecht, supra note 22. 
209 Id.; see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 71530 (West 2010). 
210 Hecht, supra note 22. 
211 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6604(b) (West 2012). 
212 Hecht, supra note 22. 
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oil or natural gas platform.213  The partial decommissioning of the 
platforms, allowed by the Rigs-to-Reef Project, may only take place 
after the CDFG has determined that California should take ownership 
of the platform; thus, the CDFG plays a key role in granting or 
denying final approval of the implementation process.214  
Under A.B. 2503, the California Ocean Protection Council 
(OPC), is allocated one of the most important roles in the 
implementation process.215  The OPC is tasked with evaluating the 
oil and gas companies’ application to the Rigs-to-Reef Project in 
order to determine whether allowing the partial decommissioning of 
the oil or natural gas platform will benefit the marine environment.216  
The bill provides OPC with the authority to conduct scientific 
research, with the help of the California University and California 
State University systems,217 in order to determine whether the partial 
removal will benefit the marine environment more than complete 
removal of the platform.218  The OPC must conduct this scientific 
research for each proposal, and evaluate the environmental impact on 
a case-by-case basis.219  Thus, considering that one of the primary 
focuses of A.B. 2503 was on potential environmental benefits 
                                                          
213 Id.  One of the requirements for federal approval of the partial removal 
of an oil or natural gas platform is that the state has accepted ownership of the 
platform through accepting the platform as a donation to the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  
Id.  However, the CDFG has to be careful when approving the oil and gas 
companies’ applications, as acceptance into the program means that California has 
accepted ownership of the decommissioned platform.  With the ownership comes 
questions regarding whether the state is also assuming liability for any issues that 
may arise from the decommissioning and upkeep of the platform.   
214 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6620 (West 2010); see also Hecht, supra 
note 22. 
215 Hecht, supra note 22. 
216 Id.  By placing the OPC in charge of determining whether the 
application for partial removal will benefit the marine environment, A.B. 2503 
placed one of the most controversial aspects of the debate surrounding the Rigs-to-
Reef Project in the hands of a single state agency.  The OPC not only must conduct 
scientific studies on the environmental impact of the partial decommissioning 
proposal, but also must determine that the partial removal would provide greater 
environmental benefits than complete removal.  Furthermore, the OPC must 
conduct this analysis for each application.  Id.   
217 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 71500(a)(4) (West 2010). 
218 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6601(g) (West 2010). 
219 Hecht, supra note 22. 
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associated with implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project in 
California,220 the OPC plays one of the most crucial and demanding 
roles involved in the implementation process.221 
The third agency, the State Lands Commission (SLC), is 
responsible for the calculation and allocation of the removal cost 
savings.222  Under A.B. 2503, oil and gas companies must allocate 
between 55% to 80% of their removal cost savings to the specified 
state funds created for the implementation of the Project.223  The 
SLC’s main responsibility is to ensure that the oil and gas 
companies’ calculations of removal cost savings are accurate and 
reasonable.224  A.B. 2503 provides the SLC with the authority to 
request information and documentation relating to the oil and gas 
                                                          
220 See supra notes 199, 191–202. 
221 Hecht, supra note 22.  One of the main reasons that A.B. 2503 was able 
to generate enough support to pass both the Assembly and Senate of the California 
legislature was its focus on the environmental impact, especially the potential for 
increasing fish populations and enhancing marine environments, that implementing 
the Rigs-to-Reef Project could have in California’s coastal waters.  With this focus, 
the OPC will be under constant scrutiny from both proponents and opponents of the 
bill, especially environmental groups.  Therefore, the OPC must ensure that each 
decision it makes regarding whether the partial decommissioning will benefit the 
marine environment is based on accurate scientific information that will withstand 
intense scrutiny.   
222 Id. 
223 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6618(c) (West 2010).  Instead of basing the 
percentage of the removal cost savings on the depth of each oil or natural gas 
platform, as was attempted in S.B. 1, A.B. 2503 establishes that between 55% to 
80% of the removal cost savings must be allocated to the state funds; what 
percentage, within this range, an oil or gas company must allocate depends on 
when the company’s proposal for acceptance to the Rigs-to-Reef Project is 
approved.  Id.  For example, if an oil or gas company’s proposal is approved before 
January 1, 2017, the company only has to allocate 55% of its removal cost savings 
to the state funds.  However, if the company’s proposal is approved on or after 
January 1, 2023, the company must allocate 80% of its savings to the state.  Thus, 
the allocation percentage increases the longer it takes for a company’s proposal to 
be approved.  Id. 
224 Id. § 6614(b).  The implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in 
California would allow oil and gas companies to partially remove their oil and 
natural gas platforms, thus saving substantial costs on the removal process.  A 
portion of this removal cost savings must be allocated to various state funds 
associated with the implementation of the Project.  SLC is the agency that ensures 
the oil and gas companies are providing accurate information about their expected 
removal cost savings.  Id.  
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companies’ calculation of their expected removal cost savings in 
order to ensure the accuracy of the calculation.225  The bill also 
provides that SLC’s determination in regards to the accuracy of the 
removal cost savings is final, and may only be revised or amended by 
the SLC.226  Therefore, the SLC plays an important role in ensuring 
that the state has adequate funds to effectively implement the Rigs-
to-Reef Project in California.227 
In addition to these provisions, A.B. 2503 also included a 
number of other requirements that both the state agencies and the oil 
and gas companies must meet before their application for acceptance 
into the Project will be approved.228  The first additional requirement 
is that all applications for partial removal must comply with the 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).229  The CEQA 
requires that, when making decisions that could affect the 
environment, California state agencies must consider all potential 
environmental impacts of a proposed project, including determining 
whether any viable alternatives exist that might lessen the 
environmental impact of the Project.230  By including this 
requirement in the bill, A.B. 2503 emphasized the importance the bill 
was placing on the environment by attempting to ensure that all 
options were evaluated before determining whether or not to allow 
partial removal of the oil and gas platforms. 
The next set of requirements outline additional administrative 
procedures that the state agencies must comply with when evaluating 
oil and gas companies’ applications.231  A.B. 2503 established that 
the CDFG must hold public hearings when evaluating the partial 
                                                          
225 Id. § 6614(d).  By giving the SLC the authority to compel the oil and 
gas companies to provide information and documentation of their calculations for 
their expected removal cost savings, A.B. 2503 discourages oil and gas companies 
from underestimating their savings in order to avoid having to donate a larger 
amount to the state funds.  Thus, the SLC serves as a check on the oil and gas 
companies. 
226 Id. § 6614(e). 
227 Hecht, supra note 22. 
228 Id. 
229 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6604 (West 2010); see also Hecht, supra 
note 22. 
230 Hecht, supra note 22. 
231 Id. 
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removal plans.232  These hearings are a means for the CDFG to 
inform the public about the partial removal proposals, and provide an 
opportunity for the public to voice its support for and opposition to 
the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  The bill also 
requires the CDFG to generate a plan outlining the management of 
the artificial reef and the oil or natural gas platform after partial 
removal.233  By including this provision, A.B. 2503 became the first 
California bill to force a state agency involved in the implementation 
process to consider and design a plan addressing the long-term 
impact of the implementation of the Project.234 
Furthermore, A.B. 2503 requires that the oil and gas 
companies provide all of the funding necessary for the SLC and the 
OPC to evaluate the partial removal application.235  This provision is 
especially pertinent to the OPC, as under A.B. 2503, the OPC must 
conduct scientific research evaluating the impact that the partial 
removal of an oil or natural gas platform will have on the marine 
environment for each application.236 
Finally, A.B. 2503 requires that the oil and gas companies 
indemnify the State of California and the California National 
Resources Agency against “any and all liability” that may result from 
the partial removal process.237  The bill provides the California 
                                                          
232 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6615(c) (West 2010).   
233 Id. § 6611. 
234 Hecht, supra note 22. 
235 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6601(h)(4) (West 2010).  Any costs 
associated with the SLC evaluating the accuracy and reasonableness of the oil and 
gas companies’ calculation of their removal cost savings must be borne by the 
companies, and not the state.  Additionally, the bill requires that the oil and gas 
companies fund the scientific research performed by the OPC when it considers the 
environmental impact of the partial removal decommissioning process.  Id.  
236 See supra notes 216, 221.  Though the OPC can use the California 
University and California State University systems to help conduct this scientific 
research, the research itself has the potential to be very costly, particularly when 
research must be done to evaluate each application for partial removal.  By forcing 
the oil and gas companies to pay for the research, A.B. 2503 mitigates California’s 
costs in implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project.   
237 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6616(f) (West 2010).  The indemnification 
clause specifically states that an application cannot be accepted unless the applicant 
“indemnifies the state and the department, to the extent permitted by law, against 
any and all liability that may result, including but not limited to, active negligence, 
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Natural Resources Agency with the flexibility to establish different 
indemnification clauses for each application as long as the clause 
adequately protects California and its state agencies from liability.238  
In relation to the indemnification clause, A.B. 2503 also requires that 
the oil or gas owner/operator of the oil or natural gas platform retain 
continuing liability for any “seepage or release of oil” resulting from 
the approval of a partial removal decommissioning plan.239  Under 
the bill, California must accept ownership of any oil or natural gas 
platform located in federal waters before it can approve a partial 
decommissioning plan of a platform located in federal water.240  By 
including this continuing liability clause, the bill attempts to prevent 
California from facing liability issues normally associated with the 
ownership of oil and natural gas platforms.241   
As demonstrated by the inclusion of all of these detailed 
provisions and requirements, A.B. 2503 sought to address many of 
the concerns that caused the previous two bills, S.B. 2173 and S.B. 1, 
to fail.  A.B. 2503 generated enough public and legislative support to 
pass both houses of the California Legislature on September 15, 
2010.242  Governor Schwarzenegger signed A.B. 2503 into law on 
                                                          
and including defending the state and the department against any claims against the 
state for any actions the state undertakes . . . .”  Id. 
238 Id.  Some of the options that A.B. 2503 suggests in designing the 
indemnification clause include “an insurance policy, cash settlement, or other 
mechanism as determined by” the California Natural Resources Agency.  Id. 
In regards to what constitutes adequate protection, the bill is somewhat 
vague.  However, it does suggest that one measure of adequacy is whether 
California can defend itself against any liability claims associated with the partial 
removal process.  Id. 
239 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE at § 6605.   
240 Hecht, supra note 22. 
241 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6605 (West 2010).  The continuing liability 
provision, in A.B. 2503, attempts to address two issues California faces with the 
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  The first concern is to limit 
California’s immediate and long-term liability associated with partial 
decommissioning.  The second concern is California’s ability to include oil and 
natural gas platforms located in federal waters in the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  Id.  By 
requiring applicants to agree to the continuing liability provision, the bill attempts 
to eliminate the risk of long-term liability while providing California with a means 
to incorporate platforms located in federal waters into the Rigs-to-Reef Project.   
242 AB-2503 Ocean Resources: Marine Resources And Preservation,  
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September 30, 2010, creating the California Marine Resources 
Legacy Act.243  Thus, A.B. 2503 became the first successful bill to 
garner enough support to implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project in 
California.244 
 
A. Analysis of A.B. 2503 and its Potential Impact on California 
 
Though A.B. 2503 was passed and signed into law, the bill 
leaves many questions, regarding the implementation process, 
unanswered.  One main concern associated with the bill is that it 
constrains the independent evaluative process of the state agencies in 
charge of managing the implementation of the Project.245  This 
constraint is particularly evident with the CDFG.  Under A.B. 2503, 
the CDFG is responsible for approving the partial removal 
applications.246  With this responsibility, it seems logical that A.B. 
2503 would also endow the CDFG with the authority to use its 
discretion in the approval process.  The language in A.B. 2503, 
however, seems to limit the CDFG’s discretion by requiring that the 
CDFG conditionally approve any partial removal plan if the plan 
complies with the proper process and the SLC determines the plan 
will benefit the marine environment.247  This language indicates that 
the CDFG only has minimal discretion in the approval process, and 
must give deference to the SLC’s environmental decisions.  
Therefore, the CDFG may be forced to approve proposals that it 
would otherwise have rejected.248  Hence, the CDFG does not appear 
to play an independent and evaluative role in the implementation 
process. 
Moreover, the CDFG’s apparent lack of discretion may lead 
to conflicts with A.B. 2503’s provision requiring that the partial 
                                                          
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION, 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml (click on the 
“HISTORY” tab) (last visited Jan. 1, 2013). 
243 Id. 
244 See generally Hecht, supra note 22. 
245 Id. 
246 See supra notes 213–214. 
247 Hecht, supra note 22. 
248 Id. 
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removal applications comply with CEQA.249  The CEQA requires 
that California state agencies, like the CDFG, evaluate all potential 
environmental impacts and viable alternatives before approving any 
proposal that would impact the environment.250  By constraining the 
CDFG’s discretion and forcing the CDFG to approve proposals that 
the SLC accepts as environmentally beneficial, A.B. 2503 prevents 
the CDFG from considering any viable alternatives to the proposed 
partial removal plan.  Also, the CEQA requires that the CDFG, as the 
agency ultimately approving or rejecting a partial removal proposal, 
must consider the environmental impact of the proposal before 
making its determination.251  A.B. 2503, however, allocates this 
environmental analysis to the SLC.252  Therefore, the bill’s provision, 
requiring compliance with the CEQA, and the administrative 
structure created by A.B. 2503 conflict.  With this conflict, the 
California courts may be forced to intervene in order to harmonize 
these provisions of the CEQA and the newly passed A.B. 2503.253  
The administrative structure established by A.B. 2503 will also likely 
require the California Legislature to pass additional legislation 
clarifying the authority of each of the state agencies involved in the 
management and implementation process.  However, in the 
meantime, the question as to which agency has the ultimate authority 
to approve or decline an applicant’s proposal remains unanswered. 
The second main concern associated with A.B. 2503’s 
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California is the 
amount of discretion and control that the bill seems to give to oil and 
gas companies254 that first becomes evident with the removal cost 
savings.  Under A.B. 2503, the oil and gas companies independently 
determine their expected removal cost savings.255  The bill does 
                                                          
249 Id. 
250 See supra note 229; see also Hecht, supra note 22. 
251 Hecht, supra note 22. 
252 See supra notes 224–225. 
253 A.B. 2503 became the California Marine Resources Legacy Act when 
it was signed into law in September of 2010.  See Hecht supra note 22.  With this 
conflict, the California courts would have to assume a legislative role and resolve 
the conflicts between the CEQA and the California Marine Resources Legacy Act.  
Id. 
254 Hecht, supra note 22. 
255 See supra notes 223–224. 
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provide the SLC with the authority to evaluate the accuracy and 
reasonableness of the oil and gas companies estimate.256  However, 
this evaluation is based on information and documentation provided 
by the companies.257  The majority of the funds for implementation 
and management of the Project come from the proportion of removal 
cost savings allocated to the state’s agency funds.  Hence, by 
providing the removal cost savings estimate and the information used 
to evaluate this estimate, the oil and gas companies essentially 
control the funding that will be allocated to California’s Rigs-to-Reef 
Project. 
Additionally, the oil and gas companies design the partial 
removal proposals to be approved by the OPC.258  After receiving the 
application, the OPC compares the environmental impact of the 
partial removal proposal with the environmental impact that complete 
removal would have on the marine environment.259  However, A.B. 
2503 broadly defines partial removal as an alternative to complete 
removal.260  Thus, the oil and gas companies will be able to define 
practically any decommissioning proposal as a partial removal.  OPC 
is then forced to approve these broadly defined partial removal 
proposals, even if their beneficial impact on the marine environment 
is only slightly greater than complete removal.261  Thus, the broad 
definition of partial removal forces the OPC to give potentially 
inappropriate discretion to the oil and gas companies’ partial removal 
proposals.   
Furthermore, the oil and gas companies also fund all of the 
environmental research associated with the approval process.262  
Under A.B. 2503, the OPC must conduct scientific research for each 
partial removal proposal in order to determine whether allowing the 
partial removal will result in a net benefit to the marine 
                                                          
256 See supra note 225. 
257 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6614(d) (West 2010). 
258 Hecht, supra note 22. 
259 See supra note 216. 
260 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6602(m) (West 2010).  A.B. 2503 defines 
partial removal as “an alternative to full removal of an offshore oil structure . . . .”  
Id. 
261 Hecht, supra note 22. 
262 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6601(h)(4) (West 2010). 
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environment.263  The fact that the oil companies fund the OPC’s 
research once again vests control of the implementation process in 
the companies.  The oil and gas companies’ control over the funding 
raises questions regarding whether the scientific data will be truly 
unbiased or whether the companies will be able to influence the data 
to reflect the needs and wants of the oil and gas companies.264 
The third main concern associated with A.B. 2503 revolves 
around liability issues and the indemnity clause.  Though A.B. 2503 
includes a continuing liability clause and an indemnification 
clause,265 California may still face potential liability problems 
associated with the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.  The 
continuing liability clause only addresses liabilities associated with 
seepage or release of oil or other chemicals; thus, this clause fails to 
address whether California or the oil and gas companies are 
responsible for any liabilities associated with the management and 
ownership of the decommissioned platforms.266  Considering that 
these potential liabilities are not mentioned in the continuing liability 
clause, it appears that California would be responsible for any legal 
claims made in relation to the management and ownership of the 
platforms.267   
                                                          
263 See supra note 216. 
264 Though forcing the oil and gas companies to fund the scientific 
research saves California state agencies money during the implementation process, 
it also has the potential of creating deferential relationships between the oil and gas 
companies and the research institutions.  The institutions will want to continue to 
receive funding in order to conduct their research on the environmental impacts of 
the implementation of the Project, and thus in order to receive this funding the 
institutions may present data that is slightly biased towards the oil and gas 
companies.  
265 The continuing liability clause in A.B. 2503 provides that oil and gas 
companies are to remain liable for any seepage or release of oil or other toxic 
chemicals from the offshore platforms.  See supra note 238–241.  The 
indemnification clause requires the oil and gas companies to sign a clause, which 
provides a means for California to pay for any future liability costs associated with 
the partial removal of the oil and natural gas platforms before decommissioning can 
occur.  See supra notes 237–238. 
266 Hecht, supra note 22. 
267 Id.  Examples of management and ownership claims that California 
may be liable for, according to the language of A.B. 2503, are any injuries that 
occur in relation to the structure, such as injuries suffered by ship owners or divers 
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Proponents of A.B. 2503 may argue that even if California is 
liable for claims associated with the management or operation of the 
platforms, the costs associated with these liabilities are covered by 
the indemnity funds generated by the indemnification clause.  
However, in the long-term, these indemnity funds may not be 
sufficient to cover all costs associated with the partial removal 
process.  A.B. 2503 specifically provides the California National 
Resources Agency with the flexibility to create different types of 
indemnification clauses for each application.268  The only 
requirement for these indemnification clauses is that when accepting 
a clause, the California Natural Resources Agency must ensure that 
the funds provided by the clause will adequately allow the state to 
defend itself against any liability claims and pay any resulting 
judgments if necessary.269   
These indemnification clauses, however, are drafted and 
accepted before the decommissioning process begins.270  Therefore, it 
remains unclear how the California Natural Resources Agency could 
possibly know how much funding is necessary to include in the 
indemnification clauses in order to ensure that the oil and gas 
companies are paying for the long-term liability costs.  A.B. 2503’s 
indemnification clause provision seems too vague and too flexible to 
ensure that the funds set aside for liability claims will not run, thus 
forcing California to assume the burden of paying for the liability 
claims in the long-term.271  Finally, even if the indemnification 
clauses do provide enough funding to meet long-term liability 
concerns, California may end up having to engage in costly and time-
consuming litigation with the oil and gas companies in order to 
receive the funds promised in the indemnification clauses.272 
The final major concern regarding A.B. 2503’s 
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California is the 
environmental impact the Project will have on California’s marine 
environments.  A.B. 2503 attempted to lessen this concern by 
                                                          
who may be engaging in recreational or commercial activities on the artificial reef 
created by the decommissioned platform.  Id. 
268 See supra note 238.  
269 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6616(f); see also supra note 235. 
270 Hecht, supra note 22. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
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requiring the OPC to conduct scientific research on whether the 
partial removal proposal would result in a net benefit to the marine 
environment.273  However, this research does not provide any 
information about the long-term environmental impact of the partial 
removal proposal.  In an attempt to support its claims that artificial 
reefs created by partial removal generate new marine environments 
and increase fish populations, A.B. 2503 relies on the scientific data 
collected from studies observing the impact that the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project has had on the marine environments in the Gulf of Mexico.274  
With the drastic differences between the coastal environments of the 
Gulf Coast and those of California,275 A.B. 2503’s reliance on this 
scientific data is questionable.276  Not only is the scientific data 
regarding the impact of the partial removal on marine environments 
inconclusive,277 but A.B. 2503 also seems to assume that the Rigs-to-
Reef Project will have the same effect on California’s marine 
environments that the Project has had on marine environments in the 
Gulf States. 
In addition to relying on the alleged success of the Rigs-to-
Reef Project in the Gulf Coast, A.B. 2503 also emphasizes the 
findings of the 2007 study conducted by the California Ocean 
Science Trust (COST).278  The COST study found that based on the 
results of other studies, partial removal of oil and natural gas 
platforms could potentially benefit marine environments by limiting 
the disturbance of already existing artificial reefs developing on the 
platforms.279  Though this conclusion does encourage implementation 
of the Rigs-to-Reef Project, A.B. 2503’s reliance on the study was 
premature.  The COST study was meant to be an ongoing process, 
which sought to inform the California Legislature about the potential 
environmental and economic consequences associated with 
                                                          
273 See supra notes 216–217. 
274 See supra note 132.  Almost all of the studies conducted on the 
environmental impact of the Rigs-to-Reef Project have focused on the Gulf of 
Mexico, as this area has been the most willing to implement the Project. 
275 See supra notes 122–129; see also supra Part I.E. 
276 See supra notes 121–129. 
277 See supra note 87. 
278 Hecht, supra note 22. 
279 See supra note 95. 
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implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project.280  The California Natural 
Resources Agency, which commissioned the COST study, intended 
the study to produce a report, which the California Legislature could 
use to help develop an implementation policy that would address the 
environmental and economic consequences of the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project.281  However, before the first COST report was completed, 
A.B. 2503 was proposed.282  Thus, A.B. 2503’s reliance on the study 
could not have been as extensive as the bill purports.  Instead, A.B. 
2503 prematurely proposed the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project in California before the legislature could evaluate the COST 
study’s findings and before further scientific research could be 
conducted to determine the potential long-term environmental and 
economic impact of the Project. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
With the passage of A.B. 2503 in 2010, the Rigs-to-Reef 
Project was finally implemented in California.  Although A.B. 2503 
attempted to create a comprehensive plan for the implementation 
process, the bill failed to address many important details associated 
with implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California.  Primarily, 
A.B. 2503 provides the oil and gas companies with too much control 
over the implementation process, which limits the authority of state 
administrative agencies in charge of the management and approval of 
the Project.  Furthermore, A.B. 2503 exposes California to potential 
long-term liability costs and lawsuits without ensuring that the oil 
and gas companies will provide the funds necessary to cover these 
potential liability costs.  Finally, A.B. 2503 relies on inconclusive 
scientific information by proposing implementation of the Project 
before studies could be conducted on the long-term effects the partial 
removal project would have on California’s diverse marine 
environment.  The California Legislature, and potentially the 
California courts, will likely have to enact additional laws in order to 
supplement the shortcomings of A.B. 2503.  Overall, A.B. 2503 was 
shortsighted and failed to consider the potential long-term 
                                                          
280 See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at i. 
281 Hecht, supra note 22. 
282 Id. 
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environmental and economic consequences that may arise from the 
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California. 
